This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

SECRET

Bob— (THIS IS STRICTLY INTER NOS BY THE WAY)

Date 45An 91
HRP 89-2

This presents me with a considerable problem. In the first place, 'obviously can't say what the SS would or would not think about it. FAME ALL I know is that Paul told me he and Ray or somebody looked at some draft or other of this thing—or maybe it was 50-50 I Mon't Monw—which they thought looked all right. As for as I am concerned, however, on the one reading I've done, I don't feel at all sure the SS would be completely happy about this as is.

get in on this thing before you had this meeting. You told me a while ago that this job, for some reason or other, had to be published before Tuesday. I don't happen to know the reason for this unseemly haste, but I suppose it's an entirely fraudulent one the way it usually is. Anyway, suppose I took the horn by the bulls right now and said I represented the staff and would under no circumstances allow this thing as is to be published. Leaving everything else aside—and that would be a hell of a lot to lea e aside too—the result could be, to say the least, to embarrass CIA to a rather marvellous degree. Again leaving a good deal aside, poor old CIA words could easily be left in exactly the position we have made so much fuss over about these other people—the business of welching a dissent after agreement at a meeting where representatives actually had no power to speak.

f course, I dongt know what has gone on at your meeting, and possibly

(OVER)

000079

This is a TEMPOHARY SCREMENT only, for the use of DCLARS.
The reconfrom that is a reconstruction of the second solution of the second sol

Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RDF 84-00022R000200030047-9

by this time, all my objections have been met. So frankly, I dnn't know what in the hell to do. If I were to join the meeting now and attempt to get my points across, I'd only co fuse the issue. I'd also not be sure I was doing what the SS wanted wich wouldn't help any. Furthermore, this is a thing that ought to be studied a bit, and I haven't had the time really, to get a decent impression of the study.

some of which you will note are mere editorial flim flams of no consequence that the old pedant can't resist and see if you can bring any you think important before this august body, possibly setting some of them taken care of.

In general, it seems to me that the paper tends to be weak—to offer arguments in both sides, leaving the reader to make up his mind. We say that they can do it but we don't think they will, but we don't—at least to me—make it at all clear why we think they won't. It sounds as if we had sort of a hunch that they won't. The references to "international com munism" are awfully vague, and I don't think the assumptions about poviet influence can yet be supported.

I'd be tempted to go as far as to say that for those who have to worry day by day about a CC invasion of FIC, tis would be so inconclusive as to increase their worries no ends they still wouldn't k ow, and their tempers—if they were mine—would be aggravated.

If you can think of any way to let the SS still get a crack at this, I think it would be a good thing. If you can't, you'd better get the best job you can and put it out. G